Reliability (survival analysis, to biostatisticians) is a key ingredient for making decisions that mitigate the risk of failure. The other key ingredient is utility. A decision theoretic framework harnesses the two, but to invoke this framework we must distinguish between chance and probability. We describe a functional form for the utility of chance that incorporates all dispositions to risk, and propose a probability of choice model for eliciting this utility. To implement the model a subject is asked to make a series of binary choices between gambles and certainty. These choices endow a statistical character to the problem of utility elicitation. The workings of our approach are illustrated via a live example involving a military planner. The material is general because it is germane to any situation involving the valuation of chance.
Introduction and Overview

Preamble: Motivation and Objectives
Perhaps a better title for this paper could be "The Utility of Chance", but it would detract from its motivating import, which is applied and pragmatic. Indeed, the work here was suggested by a scenario wherein the author was asked to determine if the reliability of an amphibious landing tank, called the "Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle" was in excess of .999, a number sacrosanct to a commanding general of the U.S. Marine
Corps. By reliability, we mean the survival function evaluated at any specified time, There are two aims that underlie this paper. The first is to advocate the need for utility considerations in the reliability arena including a suggestion for its general shape.
The second is to propose a statistical approach based on the item response theory models (also known as a choice models) for eliciting an individual's utility. However, to set a formal stage for achieving the first aim, we need to distinguish between reliability (or the survival function) as an unknown chance or propensity , and survivability as ones subjective (personal) probability about the unknown chance. By propensity we mean the purported causes of observed stable relative frequencies; see Popper (1957) .
Propensities are invoked to explain why repeating a certain kind of experiment will generate a given outcome type at a persistent rate; they are constrained to be between 0 and 1, both inclusive. Regarding the second aim, statistical methods for eliciting utilities are virtually non-existent, and regrettably so, because such methodologies can vastly enhance the utility assessment enterprise. Some exceptions are the papers of Mosteller and Nogee (1951) , Becker, De Groot and Marschak (1964) , and Novick and Lindley (1979) .
Stripped of the reliability centered application that has motivated our work, the underlying theme of this paper should have a wider appeal. It is germane to any situation that entails the desirability of a chance. For example, how much more desirable is a coin with a propensity of heads of say .95 to a coin whose propensity of heads is .93, given that the coins are to be used for gambling? Similarly, how much more desirable is a pill with a cure rate of .98 to one with a cure rate of .95, given that the former could cost much more than the latter? To address issues such as these we need to assess the utility of propensity. But first in order are some comments on the roles of reliability and survival analysis in risk management, the roles of probability and utility decision in making, and the structure of a decision problem. Sections 1.2 through 1.4 are devoted to these topics. Section 1.5 is a summary presentation of de Finetti's (1972) theorem on infinite exchangeable Bernoulli sequences, and how this theorem may provide a hook on which the essence of the material here can be thought of. The rest of this paper, Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5, pertains to the utility of reliability, a model for eliciting utilities, deploying the model, and a live application, respectively. Section 6 closes this paper. It may be of relevance to note that the matter of a utility of chance is to be contrasted with that of the utility of probability for which there is a precedence in the works of Lindley (1976) , and Good and Card (1971) .
Reliability and Survival Analysis in Risk Management
Reliability (Survival) analyses done by engineers (biostatisticians) provide yardsticks for quantifying the random nature of lifetimes. We quantify this randomness for managing the risk of failure. Managing risk means making choices that minimize the losses caused by adverse events. In the context of engineering, such choices pertain to deciding between competing designs, managing maintenance, or the acceptance/rejection of manufactured lots. In biomedicine, decision making pertains to treatment options, and other choices that impact survival and the quality of life.
Coherent Decision Making: Probability and Utility
Coherent decision making rests on two pillars, probability and utility, and the principle of maximization of expected utility (MEU). Probability quantifies uncertainty and utility quantifies preferences. Utility in statistical inference is via loss functions, such as squared error, absolute error, linex, etc.. Such loss functions are stylized. There appears to be a dearth of literature in statistical outlets about eliciting the actual loss functions of decision makers. This state of affairs is also true in the engineering sciences such as filtering, control, and information fusion, wherein a use of squared-error loss functions seems to be the norm.
The Structure of a Decision Problem
Suppose that a decision maker D is required to choose one among a set of n mutually exclusive and exhaustive actions, a 1 , a 2 ,..., a n . Associated with a i , are k i outcomes (states of nature) θ ij , j = 1, ..., k i , assumed mutually exclusive and exhaustive. When D chooses a i , D is uncertain about the outcome. Let P(θ ij ) be D's probability of occurrence of θ ij , i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., k i ; P(θ ij ) is personal to D. Let U(θ ij ) be D's utility of θ ij ; U(θ ij ) is also personal to D. U(•) is a numerical quantity between 0 and 1, and if U(θ ij ) > U(θ im ), j = m, then D prefers θ ij to θ im . We assume that all the θ ij 's can be preference ranked by D (i.e. D satisfies the axiom of completeness).
The focus of this paper is to develop a procedure for obtaining U(θ ij ), in a manner that ensures a certain kind of consistency; this will be clarified later in Section 4.1.
The expected utility of a i is,
and the MEU principle prescribes that D choose that a i for which E[U(a i )] is a maximum. In developing an argument for this principle D assumes that there exists a θ ij , say θ * for which U(θ * ) = 1, and some other θ ij , say θ * for which U(θ * ) = 0. The θ * and θ * are known as anchor points. In our particular application the θ ij are propensities; thus θ ij ∈ [0, 1], with anchor points U(0) = 0, and U(1) = 1.
To harness the notions of reliability and survival analysis for risk management, we need to cast them in the decision making framework described above. One approach to doing so is motivated by de Finetti's Theorem (1972) on exchangeable sequences. The theorem leads to the view that the reliability and the survival function are a chance (or a propensity), and not a probability. By contrast, Kolmogorov (1969) does not distinguish between chance and probability, so that to him reliability is a probability.
It is not clear as to how under this conventional view of Kolmogorov, reliability and survival functions can be formally cast in a decision theoretic framework.
de Finetti's Theorem: Infinite Exchangeable Sequences
Let X 1 , X 2 , ..., be an infinite sequence of (non-negative) continuous random variables with the property that for some θ and all i
Then for every finite n ≥ 1,
where Π(θ) encapsulates D's uncertainty about θ. Thus for n = 1
F (x|θ) is the reliability (or the survival function) of X, and is likened to chance; see Lindley and Phillips (1976) , or Lindley and Singpurwalla (2002) . The quantity P(X ≥ x) is D's uncertainty about the event (X ≥ x) described via a personal probability. We label it as the survivability of X, and is distinguished from the survival function The goal of this paper is to assess the utility of F (x|θ), for fixed x ≥ 0.
2 The Utility of Reliability / The Survival Function It can be so that D is risk prone for small values of F (x|θ) and risk averse for large values of F (x|θ) making the utility function S-shaped; similarly, a reverse S-shape, mutatis-mutandis.
Eliciting Utility: Some Caveats.
For convenience set F (x|θ) = c, for c ∈ (0, 1). Recall that U(c) is that chance, say p * , at which D is indifferent between receiving a c for sure, versus a p * -gamble.
The conventional approach for eliciting p * , revolves around two methods, fixed probability, and fixed state [cf. Hull, Moore, and Thomas (1973), or Farquhar (1984) ]. In the former, D is presented with a p * -gamble, and is asked to choose a c ∈ (0, 1) for which D is indifferent between c and the p * -gamble. The c so chosen is called the certainty equivalent of the gamble. This exercise is repeated for a range of values of p * ∈ (0, 1). In the fixed state method, c is fixed and D is interrogated over a range of values of p until D converges on a p * for which D is indifferent between receiving the fixed c and a p * -gamble. Either method is cumbersome because it is difficult to iterate around an indifference value of c or p. However, for any fixed p, it may be easier for D to make a binary choice between receiving a sure c versus a p-gamble. Indeed, this is the essence of our proposed choice model based approach for eliciting utility; this approach is discussed in Sections 3.
In addition to the elicitation difficulty mentioned above, there are two other issues associated with the conventional approach. For one, there is no assurance that D will be consistent in the declared values of p. Specifically, the p's should be non-decreasing in F (x|θ) -the monotonicity requirement-and they must be invariant with respect to the anchor points used to elicit them -the invariance requirement. Attempts at resolving this latter type of inconsistency have entailed a use of linear programming and regression based approaches [cf. Meyer and Pratt (1968) , and Novick and Lindley (1979) , respectively].
Another feature of the conventional approach is that it being fundamentally deterministic and iterative, there is no provision for accommodating D's lack of definitiveness about the declared values. By contrast, a Bayesian procedure based on binary choices will have a built in mechanism for the treatment of D's uncertainties.
Finally, there is a price to be paid for achieving a high reliability and the survival probability. This tantamounts to a disutility. The matter of disutilities associated with high survival probabilities, has spawned the topic of "quality of life" in the health sciences, [cf. Mesbah and Singpurwalla (2008) ].
Incorporating Disutility: An Omnibus Utility.
For purposes of illustration, an archetypal function that is able to reflect the feature that an increase in reliability should be accompanied by an increase in cost, so that the disutility due to cost is an increasing function of reliability, can be of the form
for some δ > 0.
Combining this disutility with the utility, yields an omnibus utility for reliability (or survival) as:
illustrative.
A Probability of Choice Model for Utility Elicitation
The thesis that it is easier for D to make a binary choice between the options of receiving an F (x|θ) ∈ (0, 1) for sure, or receiving F (x|θ) = 1(0) with chance p(1 − p), versus arriving upon a p by iteration motivates us to consider Probability of Choice Models as a possible mechanism for eliciting utilities. In Section 3.1 we motivate and introduce our model. A use of this model entails fixing c at some c i , and p at p ij , and then asking D to make a binary choice between a sure c i versus a p ij -gamble, for j = 1, 2, ..., n i . We set Y ij = 1(0) if D opts (does not opt) for the gamble. We repeat this exercise for different values of c i , i = 1, 2, ..., n i . Using the Y ij as data, we estimate the model parameters, and for every c, find that p for which the probability of choosing the p-gamble is 0.5. This binary choice strategy resonates with the method used by Mosteller and Nogee (1951) who consider the proportion of times a subject chooses the various gambles.
The Proposed Model for Utility Elicitation
The proposed model is based on how hard or easy it is for D to make the binary choices.
Given below are the boundary conditions for a rational D:
• When p = 1, D will choose Y = 1 for all c < 1;
• When p = 0, D will choose Y = 0 for all c > 0; 
Implementing the Model
For any fixed c, our aim is to find that (p − c) for which P(Y = 1|α, β; c, p) = In actual practice the values chosen for c i and p ij will not involve the boundary conditions since there is no need to elicit preferences for such clear cut situations. For purposes of discussion, suppose that the data Y ij , j = 1, ..., n i , yield α i and β i as the maximum likelihood estimators of α and β, respectively; see Appendix A. Then, the
, will be of the form:
Consequently, with utilities being constrained to lie between 0 and 1, D's utility for c i will be: 
Adjacent Point Gambles and Coherence
The elicitation of D's Y ij 's discussed in Section 3.2 presumes end point gambles; i.e. The adjacent gamble process can start-off with some c i and an end point gamble to obtain a U(c i ). This is followed by picking a c k between c i and 1 (or between 0 and c i ) to obtain a U(c k ) via a p kj -gamble involving U(c i ) and 1 (or involving 0 and U(c i )).
Once U(c i ) and U(c k ) are at hand, these can be used to obtain U(c m ) for c i < c m < c k via a sure c m versus a p mj -gamble.
The adjacent gamble approach will help achieve the monotonicity requirement of the utility function but will not guarantee it. This is because of the inherent randomness in the proposed approach which is based on estimating α and β. For a c m ∈ (c i , c k ) ,
should U(c m ) be greater (less) than c k (c i ), then a way to achieve monotonicity would be to let U(c m ) lie on the line segment joining U(c i ) and U(c k ). A strategy such as this is used in isotonic regression [see, for example, Barlow, Bartholomew, Bremner, and Brunk (1972) ].
The matter of resolving inconsistencies caused by the failure of invariance is more difficult to deal with. Novick and Lindley (1979) propose elicitation based on all possible triplets of the form 0 ≤ i < m < k ≤ 1, each triplet entailing a gamble, which we denote as a p imk -gamble. A least-squares analysis involving the minimization of the U(•)'s with respect to log-odds of the type
is then performed; this results in a utility function U(c m ). Some discussion on an approach such as this is in Becker, De Groot and Marschak (1963) .
The Incorporation of Uncertainties: A Bayesian Approach
Philosophical considerations aside, an approach based on the maximum likelihood estimators α and β suffers from the drawback that exact measures of uncertainty about the inferred utility function U(•) are difficult to obtain. This is so even at the level of pointwise confidence limits for the U(c i )'s, i = 1, ..., n. On the other hand, a parametric Bayesian approach is able to account for the underlying uncertainties by the process of averaging out with respect to the posterior distributions of α and β. To see how, suppose that Π(α i , β i ) denotes the joint prior distribution on α i and β i , for i = 1, ..., n; a specific case is described in Section A.1 of Appendix A. For any fixed c i and data Y ij , j = 1, ..., n i , the above prior will lead to a posterior distribution of α i and β i , say Π(α i , β i ; •). Then ω i , a Bayes assessment of ω i = (p i − c i ), would be the solution of
With ω i , i = 1, ..., n at hand, we may obtain the U(c i ), i = 1, ..., n, by mimicking the procedure outlined before the ω i obtained via the method of maximum likelihood.
5 Application: The Utility of a Vehicle's Reliability
The following real life example pertains to assessing the utility of reliability of a yet to be designed manned ground combat vehicle, as perceived by D, a military analyst. D is also an officer in uniform (retired) and is thus knowledgeable about strategic needs.
Furthermore, D is a well trained operations research analyst exposed to analytical thinking and decision making. Knowing the utility of reliability (for a mission time that is specified by D) will help the government procurers specify the vehicle's design and .3, .4, .45, .5, .55, .6, and .7 , for the adjacent point gambles.
The gamble probabilities p ij were chosen to ensure that neither the gamble nor the sure thing would always be preferred for any of the reliabilities. An inspection of the entries in Table 5 .1 suggests that D tends to be risk averse, because D opts for the p ij -gamble only when p ij ≥ c i . The entries of Table 5 .1 when used to obtain the U(c i )'s via the method of maximum likelihood and also the Bayesian approach (using the independent gamma priors described in Section A.1 of Appendix ) yields results that are almost identical; specifically U(.5) = .5, U(.6) = .6, U(.7) = .7, U(.8) = .93, U(.9) = .92. for an upward jump at .8 followed by a slight drop of .01 at .9. This suggests that D is risk neutral for values of reliability up to .7 and is risk averse for values of reliability greater than .7. The drop in utility at .9 is an aberration that, hopefully, can be avoided by using adjacent point gambles. The essence of the message of Figure 5 .1 is that there does not appear to be any gain in utility in going from a reliability of .8 to a reliability of .9. Thus to this D, the strategic worthiness of the vehicle matures at a reliability of about .8; higher reliabilities are of little strategic consequence. A similar conclusion seems to be true with a consideration of adjacent point gambles, the data for which are given in Table 5 .2 below. The data of Table 5 .2 was used to obtain D's utility of reliability via both the method of maximum likelihood and the Bayesian approach (described in Section A.1 (involving independent gamma priors). Table 5 The plots of Figure 5 .2 suggests that for the priors chosen, the method of maximum likelihood yields uniformly higher values for the utility function than those yielded by the Bayesian approach, at least for the chosen priors. The differences however, are not substantial, and especially so, considering the fact that the Bayesian approach has a built in mechanism for incorporating the underlying uncertainties. Even though the raw entries of Table 5 .2 suggest that D appears to be risk prone, the S-shaped nature of the plots of Figure 5 .2 suggests that D tends to be risk neutral. The disparity between the intuitive conclusions that are formed by an inspection of the raw data, and those revealed by a formal analysis of these data is due to the smoothing of the data and the consistency that is enforced by the model of Equations (3.3) and (4.2).
Finally, the likes of Figure 5 .2 suggest that there is little by the way of utility for reliabilities .5 or below, and that there is not much, if any, to be gained in going from a reliability of .8 to .9, at least under a Bayesian approach. Thus the need to push for reliability numbers such as .999 that General Officers usually tend to demand is unwarranted. Whereas we have not performed a reliability analysis of the vehicle in question, we have been told by D that the new vehicle reliability specifications tend to be in the form of 0 failures in 1000 operational hours, a requirement that is "fanciful and without connection to the real world".
6 Summary and Conclusions.
In this paper, we have advocated the point of view that a purpose for assessing the reliability and the survival functions is to help make decisions that mitigate risk. We have then cast the matter in a decision theoretic framework by leaning on a distinction between chance and probability. This has then been followed by proposing a general architecture for the utility of chance or reliability, including some boundary conditions.
We have then proposed a statistical approach for assessing utilities based on binary choices between gambles and certainties. To facilitate this approach we have proposed a new choice (or item response theory) model that has features which parallel the Rasch Model in the sense that both models are indexed by a difference − in our case (p − c). Here, this difference is germane because the ease with which D can make a choice depends on the closeness of c and p. The Grade of Membership Model (GOM), discussed by Ershova, Fienberg and Joutard (2007) , encompass aspects of the Rasch Model [cf. Ershova (2005) ], and offers prospects for developing utility elicitation models more sophisticated than ours. The GOM model is difficult to appreciate and will require much thought to put it to work. Even though the material of Section 3 on using a Choice Model for utility elicitation is focused on the utility of reliability, the ideas therein are general enough for eliciting utilities in contexts that go beyond the special case of reliability.
There is much literature on utility theory and utility elicitation by economists, decision theorists, game theorists, mathematicians and statisticians. The names associated with these literatures are distinguished. Whereas we have endeavoured to gain an appreciation of as much of these works as is possible, it is likely that we may have missed some contributions that make our approach and our model for utility elicitation not new. But assuming that the above is not true, the work described here may open up avenues for future investigations.
Appendix A
A.1 The Likelihood Function and Maximum Likelihood
With respect to the notation of Section 3.1, with c fixed at c i , and p at p ij , the likelihood of α i and β i given the data y ij , j = 1, ..., n i , with y ij = 1 or 0, is of the form: In writing out the above, we assume that given α i and β i , D's choices for the Y ij 's, j = 1, ..., n i are independent over the p ij 's. This tantamounts to assuming that in making a choice y ij , D forgets his (her) previous choices y ik , k = j − 1, j − 2, ..., 2, 1.
One way to achieve this independence would be to select the p ij in a random order with respect to the j's. By avoiding choosing c i = 1 or 0, and p ij = 1 or 0, in the elicitation process, we can ensure that the likelihood will not involve the boundary conditions of integration. The integration has been done numerically using the bisection method.
